
WO-AL90 134 MULTIOD/ECTIVE HIERARCHICAL DECISION PROBLEMS IN C2 111 1/1
(U) UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA DOMNEY 30 JUN 05
AFOSR-TR-07-1797 F49620-04-C-0072
F/0 12/4 NL



	HOLL	DOILIED
SECURITY	CULE TAKE I	
		JUII ILD



2

• •	
	 1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS

3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT AD-A190 134 Approved for public release: DULE distribution unfinited. 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) AFOSR/NM Univ. of S. California 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) AFOSR/NN Bldg 410 8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL ORGANIZATION (If applicable) F49620-84-C-0072 NM **AFOSR** 8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS AFOSR/NM PROGRAM WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO PROJECT TASK ELEMENT NO B1dg 410 A5 61102F 2304 Bolling AFB DC 20332-8448 11 TITLE (Include Security Classification) Multiobjective Hierarchical Decision Problems in C<sup>3</sup>, III 12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Papavassilopoulos 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) FROM 1 Jun 84 TO 30 Jun 85 June 1985 13a. TYPE OF REPORT 15 PAGE COUNT Final 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP 19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Two main lines of research were pursued under the support of this grant. The first one was the study of control laws in the presence of many controllers, each one of which has his own objective and information, the decisions of each one influence the information and objectives of the others and where the controllers ignore several of the parameters involved in the description of the system equation and objectives. The second on e concerns two more classical game problem: the optimal shooting policy on a target that tries to escape, and the optimal flashing policies of two opponents involved in a duel. A total of 9 publications, and two invited talks were prepared acknowledging support of this grant. 20 DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION □ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED □ SAME AS RPT DTIC USERS 228. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) | 22c OFFICE SYMBOL (202) 767 5027 Maj. Brian Woodruff

**DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR** 

83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE



EXXXXI EXXXX TEXTERS INX

## REPORT FOR F49620-84-C-0072

## Multiobjective Hierarchical Decision Problems in C<sup>3</sup>, III

Two main lines of research were pursued under the support of this grant. The first one was the study of control laws in the presence of many controllers, each one of which has his own objective and information, the decisions of each one influence the information and objectives of the others and where the controllers ignore several of the parameters involved in the description of the system equation and objectives. Ideas from both Adaptive Control and Game Theory were combined in developing adaptive schemes for each controller, so that the behavior of the system gets closer and closer, as time goes by to the one that would result in the known parameter case. The results obtained were reported in [1–5,9]. The second one concerns two more classical game problems [6–8]. In [6] the optimal shooting policy on a target that tries to escape, and in [7,8] the optimal flashing policies of two opponents involved in a duel were studied.


In [2] a dynamical system described by an AR model with two controllers, each one having his own target requirement was considered. The parameters of the system are unknown to the controllers, who at each instant of time know the previous history of the state and of their own decisions, but not the previous decisions of the other. In [3] the controls of the controllers are also penalized, whereas in Chapter III of [4] the more general ARMAX case is staudied with similar information patterns as in [2]. Both stochastic and deterministic cases are considered and adaptive control laws are created. It is shown — under some assumptions — that as time goes by, the behavior of the systems resulting from the employed adaptive laws gets closer and closer to the one of the known parameter case. Two important issues surface in this research. One is that the estimation schemes used, which provide estimates used by the adaptive laws, should

87 19 00 90

pertain to time varying systems, although the system is time invariant. This is basically due to the fact that each controller is essentially faced with a time varying system due to his ignorance of the other controller's actions. The other issue pertains to the case where there are delays of the controls in the state equation (ARMAX case). There, the controllers have to consider a number of parameters to be estimated which is larger than the number of the unknown parameters of the real system. This is essentially due to the combination of the two facts: the ignorance of the other controller's actions and the presence of delayed controls. In Chapter IV of [4] an adaptive zero sum game was considered where the cost is the usual summation of quadratics. The adaptive schemes employed were shown to yield a stable closed loop system. In [1,9] two static cases were considered, where the controllers do not have knowledge of the other's cost parameters and information. In [1] adaptive schemes are exhibited which converge to the Nash solution of the known parameter case, whereas in [9], adaptive schemes are considered in a Nash set-up, which nonetheless lead to Pareto solutions. Publications [6-8] deal with two more classical zero sum-games. In [6] an enemy moves among certain positions and the objective is to find an optimal shooting policy. This enemy is not supposed to have shooting capability. In [7,8], both players have the ability to shoot ("flash"), but a failed use of the flash reveals the position of the one who flashed -initially they do not know each other's positions. Optimal strategies were shown to exist, and were derived and studied.

Several of the results described above were presented in the conference papers

[2,5,7,9] and the invited talks [10]



OTIC Ver TO

## Publications Acknowledging the Support of This Contract

- 1. "Iterative Techniques for the Nash Solution in Quadratic Games with Unknown Parameters," to appear in SIAM Journal on Optimization and Control, 1986.
- "On a Class of Decentralized Discrete Time Adaptive Control Problems," with W. Y. Yang, 24th IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, December 1985.
- 3. "Decentralized Adaptive Control in a Game Situation for Discrete-Time, Linear, Time Invariant Systems," with W. Y. Yang, March 1986.
- 4. "Decentralized Adaptive Control in a Game Situation for Discrete-Time, Linear, Time Invariant Systems," W. Y. Yang, Ph.D. Thesis, Dept. of EE-Systems, Univ. of Southern California, June 1986.
- 5. "Adaptive Games," 4th BiBos Symposium on Random Processes and Industrial Applications, Bielefeld University, FRG, April 1986.
- 6. "Rabbit and Hunter Game: Two Discrete Stochastic Formulations," with P. Bernhard and A. L. Colomb, to appear in Computers and Mathematics with Applications, Special Issue on Pursuit-Evasion Differential Games, 1986.
- 7. "On a Finite State Space Pursuit Evasion Game with Dynamic Information," with G. J. Olsder, invited for the 25th IEEE Conf. on Decision and Control, Athens, Greece, December 1986.
- 8. "A Markov Chain Game with Dynamic Information," with G. J. Olsder, June 1986.
- "Adaptive Nash Strategies for Repeated Games Resulting in Pareto Solutions,"
   G. J. Olsder, 1986 IFAC Workshop on Modelling, Decisions and Games, Beijing, August 1986.
- 10. Two invited talks on Adaptive Games in:
  - \* Dept. of Electrical Engineering, University of California at Santa Barbara November 1985, and
  - \* Dept. of Mathematics Katholieke Universiteit, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Game Theory Day 4 (Topics in Adaptive Games), June 1986.

ዸዺጚዹጚዹጚዹዀዀዀዀዄዺዀዹዄኯዄኯዄኯፚኯፘኯዄጜኯቜኯዄዀዄዄዄዄዄዄዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀዀ

END DATE H/MED 4-88 DIC